Last week, while public attention was focused on talk of electoral colleges and presidential aspirations, President Trump and Vice President Pence quietly tabled what may be their most revolutionary document with little fanfare, the 2020 National Space Policy.
This policy provides visionary goals, clear guidance and precise directives to focus American federal decision makers on space and industrial ambition. It should be viewed as a benchmark for Canadian politicians, policy makers, public servants and industry insiders for one simple reason. It provides a policy scale to the enormity of the space opportunity.
The enormity of US space ambitions is not only evident from a reading of the National Space Policy. Its broad scope and depth of work include the following critical pieces: Space Policy Directive 1, otherwise known as SPD-1, which enunciates a clear approach to reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program; SPD-2, marks an approach to streamlining regulatory burden for the commercial sector; SPD-3, sets in motion a National Space Traffic Management Policy; SPD-4 establishes the United States Space Force; and, SPD-5 puts in play a comprehensive set of cybersecurity principles for space systems. A final segment or collection of pieces known as the Artemis Accords, which sound like a construct from Star Trek, envisions a set of guiding global principles on the peaceful commercial uses of space. Now, it should be said that the Government of Canada proudly announced on December 16 that a Canadian will be on the first mission to orbit the moon in 2023, as a broader program to establish a human presence on the Moon.
One wonders however whether there has been an appropriate level of review by elected politicians on the treaty implications associated with Artemis. It is easy to be swayed by the clarity of thought, the eloquent language, and the evocation of childhood dreams of a utopian world, where humanity and its allies represented the best the galaxy had to offer. But, make no mistake, this is Pax Americana in near and deep space. And to date, there appears to have been little discussion about this policy in Parliament, or about the potential outcomes of signing onto a framework for the near and deep space economy among industry stakeholders.
Let’s take a combination of the National Space Policy, the various space directives, and the Artemis Accords as a body of coherent thought in the US national interest. Where are the comparable policy pieces for Canada? Is there any analysis being developed or any “White Paper” being commissioned on the role and opportunities for Canada in the future space economy, on and off the earth? Has there been any linkage to discussions on chapters in our evolving free trade agreements? What consultations have occurred with Canadian space companies about their policy and trade needs? And have our private sector leaders been asked yet to define these needs and areas of interest?
If the answer is yes to all the above, then it is clear we are not just along for the ride in the 2023 slingshot around the Moon. If that expansive body of work exists then it should be made public to articulate the scope of effort and level of investment required for stellar ambition. For example, NASA’s historical appropriations alone are worth $1.2 trillion dollars (adjusted for 2020 dollars), which amounts to $19 billion per year over its entire history. In comparison, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) budgets since 1997-98, has been in the $300 to $400 million dollar range (not adjusted for 2020 dollars).
Furthermore, Canada’s new space plan, proudly announced by Minister Bains in February of 2019, allocated an investment of $2.05 billion over 24 years. Yet, critical pieces are missing: a robust Earth observation strategy, a sector economic and trade strategy; a comprehensive regulatory review and replacement for the Remote Sensing Space Systems Act, and a clear articulation of whether Canada truly considers space a new economic, political and celestial frontier. The failure to develop these essential pieces places the Canadian private sector at a serious disadvantage. For US business, this is where the US Space policy in its entirety, and the funding associated with it, absolutely sparkles.
Some would suggest that a visionary and rigorous pan-Canadian space policy and program modelled on the US is simply beyond our fiscal and policy scope and ambition. So, what are a finite set of elements we should address? The first is appropriate funding levels and time frame. I would suggest that there is a need for predictable and sustained funding for a period of 20 to 25 years. If we are fearful of an approach consistent with US ambitions, perhaps an approach in the style of the UK is more appropriate. It stipulates that by 2030 the UK will own 10% or $100 billion of the expected 2030 trillion-dollar space economy. With a 2019 GDP of $2.8 trillion, that ten-year goal for the UK is ambitious and fixed. For Canada, with a GDP of $1.7 trillion, (60% the size of the UK economy) an equivalent target in Canada could yield a $60 billion annual piece of the projected 2030 global space pie. Compare that to the value proposition often repeated by private sector leaders where Canada’s sector is said to contribute $2.5 billion to annual GDP while supporting 20,891 jobs. In ten years, based on current trajectories, the UK will leave us in a cloud of space dust.
Second, long-term funding must be accompanied by a singular and focused whole-of-government approach that is not simply defined by every department contributing financial supports to benefit from GoC investments. Instead, this pay to play approach must be replaced with a concerted and agreed upon strategy to fund, collaborate, incubate, and procure private sector services instead of building largely internal capabilities. In the US National Space Policy, specific policy guidance and directives are given to heads of agencies to work collaboratively across departments; develop public-private sector partnerships; and create incentives for the patriation or repatriation of US companies operating abroad. Clear guidance is given for the governmental apparatus to promote technology development; improve industrial capacity; nurture and develop a robust supplier base; and ensure that future skills are in place by encouraging science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education opportunities to support leadership in space innovation. Combined with enough budgets, the federal government would not only demonstrate Canadian financial commitment to Canadian companies but also accelerate the pace of change and transformation in the federal public service.
Taken together, the first two solutions drive the third which is the matter of getting the role of government right so that it can effectively support necessary technological and economic transformations. In the past, “getting government right” was code for cost-cutting. Today, a paradigm shift is needed that goes beyond the traditional program approach of establishing program goals that are executed over a 5-to-7-year period. If program timelines extend to 20- to 25- year periods, there must be transformative program design which is agile, and allows for the direct import of innovative solutions and ideas. Finally, new program design should also integrate “mandated budget ratios” that would ensure government departments would not, during times of restraint, reduce their ability to procure private sector goods and services in order to protect internal mandates and staff complements. Such requirements would maintain the flexibility to procure goods and services for program delivery from the private sector, and incentivize adoption of leading-edge capabilities.
The fourth key element is to clearly recognize the demarcations between purely commercial use, dual use and pure defense and intelligence capabilities. In the past, too much time, energy and potential progress have been thwarted as all elements of space activity have been lumped together to try and “share the burden” of space costs and investments. Canadian decision makers need to realize that space-based interests in defence, national interests to provide public services in emergency management or open data, and commercial interests in monetizing data, products and services, are fundamentally different and require their own envelopes. I would also add that Canada’s defense policy is one example of how key decision makers were informed of the extent and scope of our military and national defense requirements, and thus facilitated improved levels of funding compared to the many decades of previous attrition in the military. That envelope, if it touches space activities, must be left sacrosanct, as it is the only part of our space plan and strategy which effectively articulates our national interests and ambitions in a strategic, international fashion. In short, it is good politics – domestically and internationally.
Finally, the fifth element of Canada’s next national policy is the need for new business models and financing arrangements. Space is a costly business and both the private and public sector need to collaborate through partnership arrangements and aspects of corporate and/or national ambition. Space-based private-public sector partnerships should be explored in order to build, over a twenty-year period, a long standing shared financial commitment to ensuring Canada’s space ambitions, in a manner that would safeguard the program from periods of protracted fiscal contraction and/or high debt and deficit reduction. Such partnerships would improve on the experiences of the past and promote the attainment of long-term-shared objectives in creating a globally competitive Canadian space industry. But before we can get to the nitty-gritty of speaking to new financing and business partnerships for the Canadian space industry, which private sector leader is willing to step up and speak strategically and for a comprehensive space policy and ambitious targets — and, not just plaintively appeal for funding and undertake glossy communications campaigns?