As Canada begins to expand its space defence capabilities now that the Defence Industrial Strategy has been released, it’s now appropriate to take another look on how Canada firs into the the United States Space Force (USSF) International Partnership Strategy released last summer.
The Strategy is appropriately subtitled “Strength Through Partnership”, and leveraging partnership is the central concept that animates the entire document. The very first line from the foreword written by B. Chance Saltzman, USSF Chief of Space Operations, says that “spacepower is the ultimate team sport” and that “space is simply too complex, too vast and too risky for any single power to control”.
If the USSF is going to achieve its goals in space, he believes, it must do them by leveraging the relationships that the United States has with its allies.
The Strategy points out that the stakes are high: “space capabilities are essential not only to our national security but also to our way of life”. Space-based capabilities provide “strategic advantage to the U.S., our Allies and partners”, and are “relied on to project and employ power on a global scale”.
Yet, the USSF said, those capabilities are more vulnerable than ever. “China and Russia have fielded reversible non-kinetic and kinetic counterspace means” against space systems, it said, pointing to China’s development of “ground-based electronic warfare (EW) systems, directed energy weapons and antisatellite (ASAT) missiles” and how Russia has “deployed kinetic counterspace capabilities.”
Since the space domain is “inherently global and… vast compared with the terrestrial domains”, the USSF said that it will necessarily require international cooperation to defend against these kinds of threats. Part of that, the Strategy added, includes recognition of the importance of “the deterrent effect of bilateral and multilateral relationships”: both by creating complex dilemmas for potential adversaries and by “shaping international rules, norms and behaviors” within the space domain.
Ends, ways, and means
The USSF divided the Strategy into “Ends”, “Ways”, and “Means”. All three are very broadly defined, and the Strategy said that the details will be part of an upcoming Implementation Plan. Each is still broken down into key concepts, frameworks and guidelines.
The Strategy’s “Ends” are relatively straightforward: “unity of effort across all U.S. stakeholders and in cooperation with Allies and partners”. The Strategy identifies three “enduring goals” to focus on: “secure collective national interests”, “communicate to ensure interoperable data, capabilities and activities”, and “integrate with Allies and partners” across “Force Design, Force Development, and Force Employment.”
This will, the USSF said, “enable our Allies and partners to be combat multipliers”.
Lines of effort
The Ways focus on three Lines of Effort (LOE): “Create”, “Integrate” and “Operate”, each related to Force Design, Force Development, and Force Employment respectively. They can also be seen in terms of the time horizon involved: a longer time horizon, a medium-term horizon, and the near-term.
LOE #1, “Create”, refers to “Creating the conditions for Allies and partners to be integrated into USSF Force Design”. This refers to the ongoing process of determining what the USSF is going to look like in the next five to fifteen years; what kinds of missions it will focus on, what kind of capabilities and technologies it will need to develop, and what the threat environment will look like. So, then, the idea is to ensure that this kind of planning is not done in a vacuum, but is done with Allies and partners in mind.
The Strategy says that Force Design should be “adopting a common baseline taxonomy with Allies and partners and defining interoperability requirements for the objective force”, “developing Capability Area Designs and Mission Area Designs together with our Allies and partners”, and “designing future concepts, experimenting and wargaming with our Allies and partners.”
Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy highlights the development of sovereign space capabilities and advanced digital tech. For these homegrown technologies to be effective on a multinational scale, they must be developed with the USSF’s LOE #1 (“Create”) in mind. By integrating into the USSF’s Force Design process early on, Canada’s newly established Defence Investment Agency (DIA) can ensure that Canadian-built systems share a “common baseline taxonomy” and meet the “interoperability requirements” demanded by the USSF objective force.
LOE #2, “Integrate”, is about “Incorporating Allies and partners into Force Development activities”. Force Development has a closer time horizon, within the next five years or so, and is largely focused on the improvement of how missions are accomplished, and of the capabilities that are used to accomplish them.
The Strategy says that the LOE is aimed at “driving the adoption of common international and applicable commercial standards with existing and future partnership frameworks”, “aligning strategies and policies to guide Force Development to further inform Force Design and Force Employment”, and “planning with Allies and partners” across “requirements, budgets, programming and execution”.
The USSF’s focus on integration aligns with the realities of Canada’s new Defence Industrial Strategy, released by Prime Minister Mark Carney in February 2026. Backed by $6.6 billion, Canada’s strategy relies heavily on a “Build, Partner, Buy” framework that designates “space” as a key sovereign capability where domestic building will be prioritized. However, when Canada cannot build a capability domestically, it will “partner” with trusted allies. To successfully win these partnership contracts and integrate into the broader North American defence supply chain, Canadian space firms will need to strictly adhere to the USSF’s LOE #2, which emphasizes “driving the adoption of common international and applicable commercial standards.”
LOE #3, “Operate”, refers to “maximizing opportunities for Allies and partners to participate in Force Employment (Generation and Operations) exercises and operations”. This refers to activities over a time horizon of the next few years or so, and therefore refers to how to employ largely existing capabilities, as well as generating new forces through recruitment and the like.
For this, the Strategy focuses mostly on having the USSF work together with its Allies for training and in their activities. The USSF said that the three focuses are “embedding Guardians, Allies and partners in each other’s campaign and operational planning”, “conducting Force Generation training, education and exercising to expand our combined awareness, analysis, actions and assessment of activities in space”, and “maximizing the use of exchange and liaison programs”, to place USSF Guardians with Allies and partners and to bring their people aboard for USSF operations.
Ultimately, the USSF’s strategy recognizes that the high cost of space systems and “exquisite” technology requirements make it impossible for the U.S. to operate alone. Through frameworks like the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) and NATO—both of which count Canada as a key member—the USSF plans to embed allied personnel directly into its operational planning. This ensures that as Canada ramps up its defence and defence-related spending to meet its new 5 per cent of GDP commitment by 2035, its expanding space capabilities will be seamlessly integrated into joint operations, effectively acting as the “combat multiplier” the USSF strategy envisions.
Key organizations
Finally, as to the “Means” to do all of this, the Strategy was somewhat more vague, saying that “the Implementation Plan will provide more detailed direction.” It did name off key organizations: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (now the Department of War), the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SQ), the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) and other Unified Combatant Commands (CCMD), Task Force Futures / Space Futures Command (SFC), and the United States Intelligence Community (IC).
Beyond that, the Strategy once again broke things down into Force Design, Force Development, and Force Employment, and the organizations that would be tasked with implementation.
For long-term Force Design, it gave Task Force Futures / Space Futures Command (SFC), the Chief Strategy & Resourcing Officer (CSRO), the Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM), SAF/SQ, and various Field Commands (FLDCOM) and Component Field Commands (C-FLDCOMs) lead roles in the incorporation of Allies and partners into the development of these new concepts and technologies.
For medium-term Force Development, key roles will be held by CSRO, STARCOM, and SAF/SQ, with other organizations supporting them in the work.
For near-term Force Employment, the Assistant Chief of Space Operations for Future Concepts and Partnerships (ACSO/FCP) will be playing a key role, along with S2 (Intelligence), STARCOM, Space Operations Command (SpOC), and the C-FLDCOMs. Various other organizations will, again, play supporting roles.
Potential risks
The Strategy closed out by mentioning a few key risks.
Resource constraints are the most notable risk: the USSF has “limited personnel, time and fiscal resources”, and so needs to be cautious. As can be expected, the Strategy suggests “strict discipline to manage resources”, and the reduction of duplication of efforts.
The other noted hazard set is “overclassification, lack of clear National policy and lack of expedited processes”; the USSF said that S2 will “work with SAF/IA, OSD and other key stakeholders” to avoid overclassification and expedite information-sharing.