As NASA pushes to return humans to the Moon and rely more on private industry low-Earth orbit, the agency’s top safety watchdog is sounding the alarm.
The 2025 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual Report paints a picture of an agency at a risky crossroads. Driven by recent budget cuts, NASA is facing a brain drain that will reduce its staff to the smallest size since 1960. Combined with a shift toward commercial “service” contracts that blur the lines of safety accountability, the panel warns that NASA is losing the technical oversight required to safely manage the Artemis lunar missions and the final years of the International Space Station.
The report came out two days before NASA announced some major changes to the Artemis program and workforce changes. NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman intimated the timing of the changes was coincidental to the reports releases as NASA had been discussions changes internally and with stakeholders for some time.
Here are they key takeaways from the report.
1. Artemis 3 is deemed unsafe as baselined
While the upcoming Artemis 2 mission is progressing well toward its early 2026 launch, the panel raised massive red flags regarding Artemis III.
“Our fact-finding this year has driven the ASAP to the conclusion that the Artemis III mission, as baselined, cannot be accomplished with appropriate margins of safety.”
“The development and test progress necessary for a version of Starship that has not yet flown in time to support a human lunar landing mission within the next few years appears daunting and, to the Panel, probably not achievable.”
- The ASAP concluded that the Artemis III mission cannot be accomplished with appropriate margins of safety as currently baselined.
- The risk is compounding because NASA is attempting a “stacking of firsts” in a single mission, including the use of the new Human Landing System (HLS), new spacesuits, complex orbital docking, and a lunar South Pole landing.
- The panel doubts that SpaceX can develop the necessary Starship V3 hardware and execute the highly complex orbital cryogenic refueling tests in time to support the mission.
- Formal Recommendation (2025-05-02): NASA must reexamine the mission objectives and system architecture for Artemis III and subsequent missions to create a more balanced risk approach, potentially redistributing these “firsts” across multiple flights.
Boeing Starliner anomalies & NASA’s reporting failure
The report provides a critical post-mortem of the 2024 Boeing Starliner Crew Flight Test (CFT) and NASA’s internal handling of the crisis.
“The Agency’s failure to declare a mishap or a high-visibility close call—despite repeated anomalies and a loss of control in at least one axis in close proximity to ISS—contradicted the intent of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8621.1D, weakened the institutional learning process, and represents a diffusion of safety accountability…”
- Prior to launch, the program suffered from incomplete system validation and the lack of a true “iron bird” ground simulator to test hardware and software integration.
- During the mission, when the spacecraft lost five thrusters and suffered a temporary loss of control, NASA failed to declare an in-flight mishap or high-visibility close call.
- The panel found that this failure to declare a mishap created ambiguity and confusion among NASA and Boeing staff regarding decision-making authorities, priorities, and risk ownership.
- Formal Recommendation (2025-05-03): NASA must revise its procedural requirements (NPR 8621.1D) to unambiguously mandate the timely declaration of a mishap or close call for any anomalous event affecting crew or spacecraft safety.
3. Commercial contracts are jeopardizing safety oversight
A major cross-cutting theme is NASA’s struggle to maintain engineering oversight when using commercial, fixed-price contracts for unproven, developmental systems like the Commercial Crew and Human Landing System programs.
“…NASA’s own responsibilities and accountability for risk management of a human spaceflight system in development was at times at odds with the ‘services contract’ mentality and culture attendant to the contracting strategy.”
- The early application of “service” contracts to developmental human-rated systems has confused roles and eroded NASA’s ability to maintain adequate technical oversight.
- In the case of Starliner, the contract structure effectively hindered NASA from vigorously asserting its unique responsibility for managing crew safety.
- Formal Recommendation (2025-05-01): NASA must realign its acquisition strategies agency-wide so that contract structures afford the agency the technical insight and safety oversight commensurate with its risk management responsibilities.
4. Severe Workforce Depletion
The panel warned that NASA is facing a critical brain drain that threatens its foundational safety and engineering capabilities.
“Throughout 2025, personnel departed NASA at a rate not seen in years.”
- In 2025, budget cuts prompted major workforce downsizing, including incentivized retirements and hiring freezes.
- By the end of 2026, NASA’s workforce is projected to drop to roughly 15,000 personnel, its smallest size since 1960.
- This rapid exodus of experienced personnel leaves the panel highly concerned about NASA’s capacity to oversee complex risks and the operational expertise required for the Artemis lunar missions.
5. The ISS is at the “Brink of safe operations”
The International Space Station (ISS) is entering the riskiest period of its operational life as it ages toward its planned 2030 decommissioning.
“The ASAP’s assessment is that the ISS program has been pushed to the brink of safe operations by significant budget cuts.”
“As a result of these resource reductions, the margin is now so thin that contingencies easily addressed in the past such as hardware component failures, cargo vehicle delays, and the need to accommodate additional crewmembers could now result in significant ISS degradation or the need to return U.S. crewmembers early.”
- The most significant technical risks are microcracking in the Russian Service Module vestibule (PrK) and the reliance on obsolete, 40-year-old Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuits.
- Recent budget cuts to the ISS program have reduced resupply vehicles, spare parts, and workforce, pushing the station to the brink of safe operations.
- Furthermore, the plan to transition from the ISS to Commercial Low-Earth Orbit Destinations (CLDs) by 2030 lacks a clearly defined, executable path and remains “aspirational”.
The solutions: How ASAP recommends NASA fix the ship
Redistribute Artemis Risk: The panel formally recommends that NASA completely reexamine Artemis III. Instead of trying to do everything at once, NASA needs to adopt a more deliberate, stepwise flight-test cadence—much like the Apollo program—to thoroughly test systems before risking a crewed lunar landing.
Reassert Government Authority in Contracts: NASA must fundamentally realign its acquisition strategy. The agency needs to stop using fixed-price “service” contracts for unproven, developmental spacecraft. The ASAP urges NASA to structure contracts so that the government retains proper technical insight and safety oversight, regardless of the commercial business model being used.
Mandate Mishap Declarations: To prevent the confusion seen during the Starliner mission, NASA must refine its procedural requirements (NPR 8621.1D). The panel states it must be “unambiguous” that any event threatening crew or spacecraft safety triggers the timely declaration of a mishap or close call.
Stabilize the Workforce and ISS Budget: The panel warns Congress and the Administration that fiscal expediency is putting lives at risk. NASA must halt the rapid attrition of its senior engineering workforce to preserve its “intellectual capacity”. Additionally, the ISS budget must be sustained—and potentially increased—to safely manage the station’s aging hardware and microcracking until it can be safely decommissioned.