When most Canadians think of space, they picture astronauts or Star Wars, not grocery supply chains or debit cards. But space isn’t just “out there”—it’s the invisible infrastructure powering daily life.
In a recent episode of the Canadian Defence and Security Network’s Battle Rhythm podcast (listen to the full episode embedded below), host Steve Saideman spoke with Brigadier-General Christopher Horner, Commander of the 3 Canadian Space Division, to discuss what Canada is actually doing in orbit.
For Horner, safeguarding the nation’s orbital assets isn’t about preparing for laser battles; it’s about protecting modern Canadian society. As the space domain becomes increasingly contested, Horner warns that losing access to space wouldn’t just be a military setback. It would trigger an immediate domestic crisis, paralyzing everything from precision agriculture to the gig economy, and costing Canada an estimated $1 billion a day.
The “Rogers outage on steroids”
Many equate space infrastructure with the GPS map on their phones. Horner notes the scale is much larger. Drawing on recent UK and US data, he estimates that roughly 20 percent of the Canadian economy operates on a “space backbone.”
“Data suggests that about a billion dollars of GDP for Canada per day would be lost without access to space,” Horner explained.
To illustrate the threat, he points to the 2022 Rogers communications network outage that briefly paralyzed retail networks across the country. Losing access to orbital assets, he warns, would be that event “on steroids.”
If an adversary were to disable Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) satellite constellations, the failures would be instantaneous across critical civilian sectors:
- Financial Systems: The ‘Timing’ in PNT synchronizes core banking networks and electronic payments. Without a precise orbital clock, ATMs go dark, tap-to-pay fails, and the financial sector grinds to a halt.
- Logistics & Transportation: Maritime shipping, inland seaways, and air travel rely entirely on space-based navigation. On the ground, commercial logistics chains and gig-economy services—like Uber Eats and SkipTheDishes—would immediately freeze.
- Agriculture: As a resource-heavy nation, Canada relies heavily on satellite-guided precision farming. Remove the signal, and automated crop management systems fail, disrupting the food supply at its source.
“It’s not end of days,” Horner noted, acknowledging that cash and farmers’ markets would survive. But he stressed that preserving a modern G7 economy requires treating space as critical national infrastructure.
A congested and contested domain
Having established Canada’s fragile economic reliance on orbital infrastructure, Horner pivoted to the grim reality of the environment itself. Space is no longer the benign sanctuary of scientific exploration; it is increasingly congested, competitive, and fiercely contested.
The most direct threats are kinetic. Horner pointed to Russia’s anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests, which recently generated upwards of 1,500 pieces of orbital debris, threatening the International Space Station. Even more alarming are 2024 reports suggesting Russia is exploring the deployment of space-based nuclear weapons. Detonating a nuclear device in orbit—a direct violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—would indiscriminately wipe out entire orbital regimes, including the Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) navigation constellations that provide GPS, and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) communications networks like Starlink.
Yet, day-to-day threats are often invisible. Drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, Horner warned of the rapid proliferation of electromagnetic warfare (EW). Adversaries are routinely deploying ground-based spoofing, jamming, and high-powered microwaves to temporarily or permanently blind satellites. Because these attacks harness the electromagnetic spectrum, they are difficult to attribute, allowing hostile actors to operate with deniability.
Compounding these active threats is the sheer volume of new assets. Horner noted that China is fielding space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities at “breathtaking speed,” deploying systems with opaque intentions under the guise of research and development.
The Canadian response
To meet these threats, 3 Canadian Space Division is expanding from roughly 375 personnel today to an anticipated 1,200 by 2035. But Horner is clear: Canada is not arming for an orbital shoot-out. Instead of developing first-strike kinetic weapons, the military’s strategy is anchored in Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and operational resilience.
With satellites sharing orbit with over 14,000 tracked objects, understanding the “pattern of life” of foreign assets is critical. As Horner put it, “You can’t defend from threats if you can’t see those threats.” The Canadian Space Operations Centre spends a massive amount of its bandwidth tracking this environment to differentiate between benign research satellites and lurking adversarial threats.
When threats materialize, Canada’s strategic response leans on deterrence through resilience—which ties directly to the government’s push for a sovereign launch capability.
If a hostile actor uses electronic warfare to disable a Canadian communications satellite in LEO, relying on foreign launch providers to replace it creates an unacceptable vulnerability window for the economy. Horner argues that true resilience means having the domestic capacity to conceive, build, and rapidly deploy a replacement on Canadian soil.
By targeting a 96-hour responsive launch window, Canada aims to swiftly replenish degraded orbital assets. This rapid-replacement capability neutralizes an adversary’s strategic advantage without escalating to kinetic warfare, ensuring the continuous flow of data that underpins the national economy.
Looking up to protect what’s down here
As 3 Canadian Space Division grows, Horner is acutely aware of the national pride tied to human spaceflight, pointing to Canadian astronaut Jeremy Hansen’s upcoming Artemis 2 mission to the Moon. Such endeavours represent global cooperation and are vital for inspiring the next generation of STEM and STEAM professionals.
However, Horner stresses that this future requires a secure foundation. “In the midst of that, we have to understand that not everybody wants to play nicely in space and use it for exploration,” he said. “They want to use it for exploitation.”
Looking ahead, Horner envisions a reality where, by 2050, humans are operating 24/7 on other celestial bodies, supported by autonomous spacecraft and resource extraction. But bridging the gap between today’s vulnerable satellite networks and tomorrow’s off-world economy requires recognizing space for what it is right now.
Ultimately, Horner distills his command’s mandate into two clear directives: ensure the Joint Force has the space-based capabilities it needs to operate globally, and defend those forces—and the nation—from space-enabled attacks.