A new assessment of global counterspace capabilities describes an orbital domain where electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations remain the only methods actively used in military operations, even as nations pledge to halt destructive kinetic testing.
For Canada, the Secure World Foundation’s (SWF) Global Counterspace Capabilities 2026 report outlines an evolving threat landscape. Addressing these emerging vulnerabilities will be a key test for Canada’s new Defence Industrial Strategy and the procurement orchestrated through the Defence Investment Agency (DIA).
By analyzing the SWF report through a domestic lens, it becomes clear that while Canada does not field offensive space weapons, the country’s deep integration into allied space architectures—and its growing commercial space defence sector—places it directly on the frontlines of these emerging operational realities.
The kinetic taboo and the rise of Cyber/EW
The SWF report notes a significant trend: while multiple nations possess the technological foundations for direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapons, current active military operations exclusively utilize non-destructive capabilities. The weaponization of space is actively occurring within the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace.
The report highlights the 2022 cyberattack against Viasat’s KA-SAT network as a watershed moment, demonstrating how attacks on satellite ground networks and user terminals are becoming standard operations in modern conflicts. Furthermore, the pervasive use of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming in regions like Eastern Europe and the Middle East has become a daily operational hazard impacting both military and civilian platforms. For the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which relies heavily on space assets for C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)—especially in the Arctic—these vulnerabilities represent a pressing operational hazard.
Active defence and the “Golden Dome”
As adversaries develop satellites capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) to closely approach high-value assets, allied nations are shifting toward active orbital defence. France plans to deploy “patrol” satellites by 2027 , and Japan has introduced a program to develop “bodyguard satellites”.
For the Canadian defence sector, the most immediate policy implication highlighted in the SWF report revolves around the US “Golden Dome for America” initiative. The Golden Dome project aims to field a multi-layered missile defence shield, which includes a space-based interceptor layer.
The SWF notes a significant policy shift regarding this program: “Canada has not been officially invited to participate in it yet but it was reported in August 2025 that the Canadian government had removed all restrictions on Canada’s air and missile defences, giving it the option to join Golden Dome”. This signals a potentially massive strategic and financial procurement decision for the Department of National Defence regarding its participation in a space-based missile shield. It should be noted that it’s unclear if the Golden Dome initiative will survive depending on the outcome of the upcoming US mid-term elections. So any decision by Canada is not imminent and any decision to proceed could also depend on the ongoing Canada – US trade negotiations.
A Canadian commercial response
Canadian industry is already stepping up to meet this specific demand. This week, MDA Space announced the launch of “MDA MIDNIGHT” at the 41st Space Symposium. Designed specifically for defence organizations. MIDNIGHT is a manoeuvrable spacecraft that integrates the company’s software-defined Aurora satellite bus with its Skymaker robotics technology. Bridging the operational gaps identified by the SWF, the platform is capable of on-orbit inspection, electronic countermeasures (ECM) to mitigate signal interference, and active RPO.
“With new and emerging threats from adversaries, the critical space infrastructure that we all depend on requires greater protection,” said Mike Greenley, CEO of MDA Space, during the announcement. This domestic push into the active orbital defence market encapsulates the broader industry pivot outlined by the SWF.
Space situational awareness and allied integration
Beyond active orbital protection, Canada remains a foundational piece of the allied space architecture. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) continues to be a cornerstone of defensive counterspace operations. The SWF report explicitly acknowledges the ongoing contribution of Canada’s Sapphire satellite to the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN)
Recent sector moves highlight how Canada is physically strengthening this capacity. The DIA recently awarded MDA Space a $32 million contract to build and operate three Ground-Based Optical (GBO) observatories across Alberta, Manitoba, and New Brunswick. Marking a major milestone in the long-anticipated Surveillance of Space 2 (SofS 2) project, this ground network is designed to work in tandem with the aging Sapphire satellite. By combining these ground-based telescopes with established on-orbit monitoring, the Canadian Armed Forces is building a hybrid architecture to continuously detect, track, and monitor deep-space objects.
Concurrently, there is a growing necessity for seamless allied integration under the US Space Force’s partnership strategies. Canada is a founding member of the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative and actively participates in major allied wargames, including the US-led Space Flag exercises and the Schriever Wargame. As allied partners transition to a more assertive warfighting posture, the CAF will need to ensure strict integration and reliable SSA data to navigate an increasingly congested domain.